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where a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused, they can not arbitrarily adopt that interpretation
which incriminates him. 12
Where the prosecution's case lies somewhere in a muddle
of hypotheses, justice can hardly be served when absolute guilt
is extracted where they are strong importations of innocence.
Such a verdict can not be called, "beyond a reasonable doubt."
S. G.
12 Burton and Conquest v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 899, 62 S.E. 2d 376
(1908).
SALES, IMPLIED WARRANTY-MANUFACTURER'S
LIABILITY TO ULTIMATE CONSUMERS ON THEORY
OF PUBLIC POLICY
The manufacturer of food for human consumption, who
packages such food in sealed containers, will be liable to the
ultimate consumer where the consumer has suffered damages as
a consequence of impurities therein on the theory of implied
warranty, irrespective of a lack of privity of contract between
the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. 1 The Supreme
Court of Virginia supports this theory on the basis of public
policy, where a smoked pork shoulder wrapped in cellophane
and labeled by the processor was purchased from a supermarket
and the purchaser's wife became ill from eating the pork due to
impurities in it prior to the time it left the processor's plant. 2
Heretofore, Virginia has followed the common law doctrine
that one who sells foodstuffs for human consumption impliedly
warrants its' fitness and wholesomeness for such purpose and is
liable not only for the result of any neglient act involved in fail-
ing to use reasonable care in the preparation and handling of
his product, but is liable on implied warranty where there is
1 Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d. 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479,
(1940).
2 Swift v. Wells, 201 Va.-, 110 S.E. 2d. 203 (1959).
RECENT CASES
privity of contract between vendor and vendee.3 In a recon-
sideration of the common law principle the court has relied
heavily on a well-reasoned Texas decision.4 There the court
laid down a broad public policy that was a turning point in that
jurisdiction, allowing recovery .on implied warranty even
though privity of contract is lacking. It is interesting to note
that the Texas court gave considerable attention to a Virginia
Law Review article, "Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees."5 It would seem that the Vir-
ginia court was waiting for a "test" to institute the theory of
recovery on implied warranty irrespective of privity.
In reaching their decision, the court said, "This permits the
placing of the loss occasioned upon the manufacturer who is in
the best position to prevent the production and sale of un-
wholesome food." 6 Here the court seems to be relying on
public policy; putting the health and welfare of the public
ahead of what some writers refer to as the technical barrier of
privity. It was said by Professor T. F. Lambert, Jr., "It is a
melancholy state of affairs to witness courts more preoccupied
with privity than consumer protection." 7
The Law of warranty is older by a century than the principles
which govern it. 8 Much has been written on the pros and cons
of implied warranty; contract or tort? 9 Warranty seems to be a
child of no one, a hybrid between tort and contract, and until
recent years it has been held by the courts to lean further towards
contract. The original recovery was through an action on the
3 Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krausee, 162 Va. 107, 173 S.E. 497
(1934); Colonne v. Rosedale Dairy Company, 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94
(1936); Kroger Grocery & Baking Company v. Dunn, 181 Va. 390, 25 S.E.
2d. 254 (1943); Blythe v. Camp Manufacturing Company, 183 Va. 432, 32
S.E. 2d. 659 (1945).
4 Supra, Note 1.
5 24 Va. L. Rev. 134-158 (1937).
6 Supra, note 2.
7 21. N.A.C.C.A. 419 (1957).
8 1 Williston on Sales § 195.
9 See generally 24 Va. L. Rev. 134-158 (1937); 23 Col. L. Rev. 621 (1935); 27
Minn. L. Rev. 117 (1943); 30 Ill. L. Rev. 398 (1935); 5 Iowa L. Bul. 86, 96
(1919); 41 Hav. L. Rev. 263 (1927); 21 N.A.C.C.A. 419 (1957);Justice Starke,
New York LawJournal, April 8-10, 1957.
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case as warranty was viewed as a deceit. 1o The earliest recorded
case allowing recovery on breach of implied warranty was in
1778.11 In 1815 Lord Elenborough said, "A dealer who con-
tracts to sell goods of a particular description is understood to
agree that he will deliver what is commonly sold in the market
under that description," and from this the courts have de-
veloped implied warranty of merchantable quality. 2
Why then privity as a barrier to recovery on implied
warranty actions? Historically there seems to be no justification
for the notion that privity of contract is essential to support an
action for breach of implied warranty. It had been suggested
that privity became a requisite only because the early law
happened to satisfy it. 3 Professor Williston says of the sub-
ject, "The difficulty which most courts seem to feel in allowing
the subpurchaser a remedy is based on the assumption that the
liability of warranties is contractual and therefore can only run
directly between a purchaser and his immediate seller; this
argument does not seem impressive as an original question." 14
But in reality the action is hybrid, not tort, not contract. A
New York court in recognizing its hybrid character said, "The
duty rested on the defendant to see, at its peril, that the food
was fit for human consumption and it is based on con-
siderations of public health and public policy.., in its essential
nature, a tort." 1 s
Most states have rejected the privity requirement at least
partially. 1 "The privity doctrine is unsatisfactory. The limi-
tation of the right to recover for the breach of an implied
warranty, in the sale of foodstuffs for human consumption, to
those in privity with the seller, . . . overlooks the fundamental
conception of liability under the early law when food sold for
human consumption occupied a preferred position over other
10 27 Minn. L. Rev. 117 (1943).
"1 Stuart v. Wilkins 1 Dougl. 18 (1778).
12 Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
'3 Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 466, 139 N.E. 576, 27 A.L.R. 1533 (1923);
Gimenez v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 264 N. Y. 390, 191 N. E. 27 (1934).
24 1 Williston on Sales § 244a.
15 Greco v. S.S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E., 2d. 557, 561, 115 A.L.R. 1020
(1938).
16 Mass., New Hamp., New Jersey.
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goods, the dealer therein being made an absolute insurer of his
product..." 1 7
What then is Virginia's position with respect to implied
warranty? Have we been holding to a common law doctrine
that does not fit the requirements of society? The exact question
presented by the recent decision has not heretofore been before
the court. 1 8 It would seem then that Virginia has been waiting
for a "test" and the Swift case has tried the Virginia law and
pierced the sanctity of the privity doctrine for the first time, at
least with respect to the sale of packaged and sealed foodstuffs.
Since the Texas decision Virginia is one of the first jurisdictions
basing relief on public policy through the broad generalization
laid down by that learned court; others are following. 1
The trend and weight of authority indicate that implied
warranty irrespective of privity of contract, especially where the
sale of sealed foodstuffs is concerned, is now the majority rule.
The theory of public policy is becoming so entrenched that
the Washington court said, "If there is no authority for the
remedy it is high time for such authority." 20
There can be no doubt as to the public policy in this state
with respect to the presented situation. The Virginia Code ex-
pressly makes it unlawful to sell or expose for sale unhealthy,
unwholesome, or adulterated food for human consumption. 21
The court made dear in an earlier decision that separate counts
of tort and contract could be joined when the injury arises out
of the same general cause of action, in a continuous course of
dealing with reference to one right and where one judgment
can be rendered.22
C. F. G.
17 Melick, Sale of Food & Drink pl 94; 23 Cal. L. Rev. 621 (1935).
18 Supra, note 2.
19 For other recent decisions see: Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609,
164 S.W. 2d. 828 (1940); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz.
163, 317 P. 2d. 1094 (1957); Lattue v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Wash. 645,
314 P. 2d. 421 (1957); Bryer v. Rath Packing Co.,-Md.--, 156 A. 2d. 442
(1959).
20 Mazetti et. al. v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.)
213, Ann. Cas. 1915 c. 140 (1913).
21 Supra, note 2; Va. Food and Drink Act Chap. 16, Va. Code §§ 3-303, 3-308
(1950).
22 E. 1. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Universal Moulded Products Corporation,
191 Va. 525, 62 S.E. 2d. 233 (1950).
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